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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2643· 
MABEL W. DRINKARD 
versus 
DRINKARD-PAYNE BUICK CORPORATION, EM-
PLOYER, ·THE EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSUR-
ANCE· OORPORATIQIN, Lil\HTED, INSURER 
PETITIOIN FOR AN APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the 
· Supre·nie Gou.rt of Appeal., of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Mabel W. Drinkard, respectfully r~pre-
sents that she is aggrieved by a final award of the, Indus-
trial Commission of Virginia, sitting· as a full Commission, 
entered on the 10th day of July, 1942, in a certain case wherein 
your petitioner was tho plaintiff or claimant and Drinkard.-
Payne Buick Corporation, Employer, and The Employers 
Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, Insurer, were the 
~~~~- ' 
In this petition the parties will be referred to either by 
2* *name or in accordance with. the positions occupied by 
them in the hearing before the Industrial Commission 
of Virgfoia, that is, the said Mabel W. Drinkard as claimant; 
the defendant, Drinkarcl-Pavne Buick Corporation as em-
ployer: and the defendant, The Employers Liability Assur-
ance 'Corporation, Limited, as insurer; the Industrial Com-
mission of Virginia will bH referred to hereinafter as the 
Commission. 
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A copy of the record of this case, duly certified by the Sec-
retary bf the Industrial Commission of Virginia, is filed here-
with arid is inade a part of this petition; 
I. 
STAT·EMENT OF PROOE.EDIN.G.S. 
On July 11, 1941, the ch;timant made application to the 
Commission for a hearin~ for compensation· under the Vir-
g'inia Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of h~r 
husband, William M. Ddnkard, while an employee of Drink-
ard-Payne Buick Corporation. 
A hearing was held befot_e Cliairrnan Nickels on September 
26, 1941, and on May 11, 1942, a decision was rendered by 
him that the death of· \iVilliatr.1 l\f. Drinkard, the employee, 
and referred .to hereiuafter as such, was caused by an injury 
arising out df and in course of his employment, but that the 
claimant was barred from :tnaking claim for coinpensation 
.by virtu~ of Section 12 of the afcfresaid Act on the ground 
that the employee had made an election hy instituting an ac-
tion at law ag·ainst a third party during his lifetime. An 
3* award based on this *decision was made on May 11, 1942, 
dismissing the claini of ydti.r petitioner for compensation. 
A review before the full Commission, at the .request of the 
claimant, was held in the case, at Richmond, Virginia, on 
June .1, 1.942, and ~ decisio]). rendered on July 10, 1942, adopt-
ihg· tlie findings df fact, with certain additions, and the con-
clusions of law of the Hearing Commissioner as the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law of the full Commission, . and 
affirming in· all i·espects the award issued thereon. The afore-
said award of the full Commission, rendered on July 10, 
1942, was received by the claimant on July 11, 1942. 
II. 
ASSIGNMENT OF E,RROR. 
Your petitioner assigns .as error the final award of the 
Industrial. Commission of Virginia dismissing- the application 
of your petitioner for r.ompensationunder The Virginia Work-
men's Comp~nsation ~t\.ct, for the death of the ~mployce, 011 
the ground that tlie employee had made an election by insti-
_tuting an action at law against the third party during his 
lifetime and by virtue of. Section 12 of the aforesaid .Act 
the claimant was barred from making claim for compensa-
tion under the aforesaid Act. 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF FThTDINGS OF FACT. 
The findings of the said Commission of the facts of 
4• this case *are simple and uncontroverted and only that 
portion of the same, believed to be necessary to reach 
a decision on the question, involved in . the assignment of 
error set out in this petition, will be related below; neither 
the def enclant employer nor the def end ant insurance carrier 
introduced any ·evidence, nor was an application made, by 
either- the employer or the insurance carrier, for a review be-
fore the full Commission, from the decision of May 11, 1942, 
by the Hearing Commissioner. -
On January 23, 1941, William M. Drinkard, the employee, 
was injured ·by an accident. arising out of and in the course 
of his employment while working for the Drinkard-Payne 
Buick Corporation, the employer, at an average weekly wage. 
in exces~ of that y.ielding the maximum compensation benefit 
of $16.00 per week, and while riding as a passenger in the 
employer's automobile in the County of Fauquier, Virginia. 
The facts obtained from an investigation of the circumstances 
of the collision, by the insurance carrier of the employer, it 
being the same. defendant carrier in this case, were used by. , 
both· the employer and the employee in the preparation of 
the pleadings in the suits filed in the Circuit Court of Fau-
quier County, Virginia, against the third party; the suit of 
the employer was instituted for property damages and there-
after and on March 8, 1941, the employee sued the third party 
for personal injuries. On March 26, 1941, the aforesaid Court 
set for trial the case of the employer against the third party 
for May 29, 1941, and the case of the employee against the 
third party £or May 30, 1941. · · 
On May 13, 1941, the employee, William l\f. Drinkard, died 
as a result of the injuries received by accident arising 
5"" out of and in ""the course of his employment, leaving the 
petitioner, his widow, and William M. Drinkard, Jr., an 
· infant son, surviving as dependents. The employer's case 
was tried on May .29, 1941, and verdict and judgment entered 
for the tl1irc1 party. The case of the employee ag·ainst the 
third partv was continued generally .. 
Qn and before May 21, 1941, the employer was advised of. 
the claim for compensation for the death of the employee by 
the claimant and the claim was taken un with the insurance 
carrier of the emplover on that date. On July 11, 1941, the 
defendant insurer advised that it would not pay compensa-
tion voluntarily and on that same date your petitioner made 
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an application or claim to the Industrial Commission of Vir- -
ginia for compensation under the Act for the death of the 
employee. 
On July 15, 1941, the claimant advised the employer that 
she would take the necessary steps to protect her interest in 
the · case against the third party, provided the employer did 
not prosec11te the same, and a copy of the letter, conveying 
her intentions to the employer; was sent the insurer and the 
Conunission; neither the e~ployer nor the insurer prose-
cuted the same and on September 22, 1941, on motion of t!ie 
claimant, the case was revived in the name of the Admiriis.; 
tratrix of the employee, with leave given to file such proper 
pleadings as may be necessary and the case ,vas continued. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT. 
The position of your petitioner may be s·ummarized as fol-
lows: 
*A. 
That the claimant, thr. dependent widow of the employee, is 
not· barred from filing claim for and receiving compensation 
u:nder the Act for the death of· the employee l;>y virtue of 
Section- 12 of the Act on the ground that the employee had 
. instituted a common law action against a negligent third 
party for personal injuries, which suit abated on account 
of his death. 
B. 
That no election was made either by the ~mployee or by 
the claimant. 
C. 
That the doct:dne of estoppel is not applicable; no one has 
chang·ed position or has been prejudiced by the action of 
either the employee or· of the claimant. 
Considering the position of the claimant in the order of 
the propositions enumerated above, your. petitioner says that: 
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(A) -SECTION 12 (AGTS.1936) CONTAINS NO ELEC-
.. TlON PROVISION. 
The Virg·inia Workmen's Compensation Act was originally 
enacted in 1918 and Section 12 included in the orig·inal Act 
provided that the rights and remedies g-ranted to an · em~ 
ployee, under the Act, in cases where the Act had been 
7* accepted by the employer and employee, *excluded all 
other rights and remedies of. such employee for personal 
injuries or death. Since this section was originally enacted it 
· has been amended five times; Acts 1920, Chapter 176, page 
256; Acts J924, Chapter 818, page 478; Acts_ 1930, Chapter 
158, page 405; Acts 1932, Chapter 279, page 485; Acts 1936, 
Chapter 36-9, page 591. Seetion 12, Acts 1918, has always 
been retained in the Act and additional provisions added 
. each time an amendment was made, however, when the Leg-
islature last amended Section 12 in 1936 the amendments of 
1932 and 1924 were stricken from the Section and the pres-
ent Section is identical with .Section 12, Acts 1920, with the 
sole exception of the fourth paragraph of the Section (Acts 
1936) which was originally enacted in the amendment of 
1930. · The several amendments and the cases construing the 
same become important in construing Section 12 (Acts 1936), 
to determine whether or not it contains an election provision 
by implication; the express provision having been eliminated. 
The provisions of the Act after earl1 amendment and the cases 
construing the same will be considered in order. 
(1) SECTION 12 (ACTS 1918).· 
As stated hereinbefore, Section 12, as originally enacted 
in 1918 consisted solely of the first paragraph of the present 
Section 12 (Acts 1936) wherein the rights and remedies of 
the employee, where he and his employer had accepted the 
provisions of the Act to pay and accept compensation on ac-
count of personal injury or death by accident, excluded all 
other rig·hts and remedies of such 1employee, his personal 
representative, etc., a,gainst his employer, on account of 
8* ~uch injury *or death, l10wever, S~ction 12. did not limit 
the employee to a remedy under the Act alone, but the 
common law remedy of the employee was not affected and the 
emp]ovec- N'uld sue the third party for the same injury for 
which he had received compensation. In Smith v. Virqinia 
Ra,ilwa11 amd Power Comvanu. 144 Vt1~ 169, 177, the (fourt 
said, in citing from a Nebraska case, t]1e following: 
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"Evidently the ,intent of the iegislature was not to limit 
an· employee to the recovery only of the workmen's compen-
sation act; but wben, as a matter of justice, the employee was 
entitled to recover a greater compensation than is provided 
for in the act, then he had the right to proceed under the 
.provisions of section 3659, and to recover as much as a jury 
would warrant for his damages and injuries, and after so re-
covering, to deduct therefrom the necessary expenses which 
his employer had been to, in paying out under the provisions 
of the act. ' ' 
The employee, under Section 12 (Ac.ts 191.8), therefore, 
could obtain an award from the employer and also obtain 
damages from a third party by his common law reil1,edy; a 
double recovery for the same injury. Section 12 (Acts 1918) 
was thus construed by the Court in C. & 0. Railway Company 
v. Palmer, 149 Va. 560, wherein the Court, in the opinion by 
Justice Holt, in discussing the Section prior to the Act of 
1920, said at page 573 : · 
'' The right of the employee to sue the wrongdoer had not 
been affected, and it· was then possible for him to dupli-
cate his recovery and to secure damages from two sources." 
The Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act thus dealt ex-
clusively :with the rights and remedies of the employee and 
the employer, as against each other, that being the purpose 
of the Act, and the neg·ligent third party had not come into 
the picture at this time. 
9* *(2) SECTION 12 (ACTS 1920). 
By ·Acts of Assembly 1920, Chapter 176, page 256, Section 
. 12 was amended by the addition of five provisions to the 
original Act. The amendments provided, first, that the mak-
ing of a lawfuJ claim ag·ainst the employer by the employee, 
or his personal representative, operated as an assignment to 
the emJ?loyer of any right to recover damag·es which had ac-
crued to the injured employee, or his personal representa-
tive, against· any other party and that the employer was sub-
rog·ated ·to such rights · and could enforce the same in his 
name, the· name of the ·employee, · or his personal represent-
ative: second,· that aJJy amount, collected by the employer 
from the third party, in excess of the amount paid by the 
employer to the employee under the Act plus reasonable ex-
penses _and attorney's fees, should be held for the benefit of 
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the injured empl~yee or other persons entitled thereto ;_third, 
that no compromise could be made by the employer or its m-
surance carrier, in exercise of the right of subrogation, with-
out the approval of the Commission and the injured employee 
or. his personal repreRcntative; fourth, that the insurance 
carrier of the employer was •suhrog-ated to the rights and 
duties of the employer; fifth, that nothing in the Act should 
make the employee of an independent contractor the employee 
of the person hiring, etc., the contractor, a provision with 
which we are not concerned. 
The new provisions of Section 12 ( Acts 1920) made it clear 
that the employee should be justly compensated for his in-
juries from the third party, however, when the employee made 
a claim for compensation, the employer was given: an 
10'* interest in the right of action against •the third party 
to the extent of his liability under the Act and the em.;. 
ployee was precluded from obtaining a double recovery, i. e., 
a recovery from the employer and also from the third party. 
The employee was assured a recovery for the full amount of 
his damages, however, if he obtained part of his damages 
from his employer, then he was entitled to receive only the 
difference over and above that amount from the third party. 
'The reme~es of the employee were not limited by this· amend-
ment, but only the amount of his recovery. The e~ercise of 
the right of subrogation, given to the employer and his car-
rier, was limited so that the employer or the insurance car-
rier could not compromise the claim against the third party 
without the approval of ti1e Comrni~Rion and the employee; 
clearly demonstrating the interest of the employee in the 
right of action against the third party, even after receiving 
compensation. Section 12 (Acts 1920) was in accord with. 
the other provisions of The Workmen's Compensation Act 
of Virginia ~n that .it assured the employee the speedy~ in-
expensive rig·ht to be a,varded compensation, without the 
pitfalls of the common law, see Richmond Cedar Works v. 
Harper, 129 Va. 481, 488, which discusses the purposes of the 
Act, and in addition thereto, this Section enabled the em-
ployee to receive full satisfaction for his injuries from a neg-
ligent third party, subject only, however, to the right of the 
employer to be reimbursed for the amount paid by him or by 
his insurance carrier to the injured employee. So it was 
that the employee was assured of a definite amount under 
the · Act and, in addition thereto, there was left to him hit\ 
common .law remedy to pursue the third .. party for the full 
amount of the injuries for which he was liable. In G. di; 
11 * 0. Railway *Compan.11 v. Palihe.r. 149 Va. 560; the Court 
construed Section 12, of the 1920 Acts, and stated that 
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prior to the amendment of 1920 the employee was entitled to 
two recoveries, one from the employer for compensation and 
the other from the third party under the common law remedy; 
that the employer had to pay compensation,. who oftentimes 
was no wise in fault, nnd at pages 572-573 this Court said: 
'' Into the construction of every act must be read the pur4 
pose of the legislature, and that underlying· purpose in this 
instance was to give relief to workmen. This relief in the 
nature of things had to be charged against the employer. Sec-
tion 12 in the original act of 1918 (A~ts 1918, c. 400) con-
sisted only of what is now the first parag·raph of that sec-
tion as amended by the Acts of 1920. , It said that an employee 
- who had received compensation under this act from his em-
ployer should not thereafter sue him-a declaration mani-
festly just. · 
''It soon became apparent that an employer might be 
mulct in compensation who was no wise at fault. The right 
of the employee to sue the wrongdoer had not been affected, 
and it was then possible for him to duplicate his recovery 
and to secure damag·es from t~vo sources. S:uch a situation 
called for relief, it was given in the amendment of 1920, and 
written into the second paragraph of Section 12. It gave 
to the employer the right to recover from the wrongdoer 
whatever he had· actually had to pay, and it took from the 
employee the rig·ht pro tanto to a double recovery, but beyond 
this it left the employee's right to recover as it was before." 
Section 12 (Acts 1920) was before the Court for construction 
in three cases: 8ou.t/l,(~rn RailumJ/ Company v. U. S. Casu-
alty Company, 136 Va. 475, 482-483 (1923), an action by the 
insurance carrier of the employer brought against the third 
party after the carrier had paid compensation to the em-
ployee; Smith v. Vir_qinia Railway and Power Cmnpany, 144 
Va. 169, 175:179, an action by the employer ag.-ainst the third 
pai·ty after the employer had paid compensation to the em-
ployee; C. d; 0. Railwa'JI Cmnpany v. Palmer. 149 Va. 
12* 560, 566-574, an action by the employee *against the 
. third party after the employee had accepted compen-
sation under the pi-ovisions of the Act of 1920. Iu all three 
of these cases the defense was made that the ulaintiff, in-
surance carrier, employer, or the emplove~, as the case was, 
was barred from pursuing· the common' law remedv against 
the third party bv virtu·e of an election of remedies ·under 
Section 12 (Acts 1920) however. this Court held, in each in-
stance, that the ~ction was mai:11tainable. 
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An employee, therefore, was not bound by an election of 
remedies as against his employer or a negligent third party, 
under Section 12, as written by the Legislature in 1920, and 
constru,ed by this Court in the three last mentioned decisions, 
but, on the contrary, and as the Court stated in 0. <i; 0. Rail-
way Company· v. Palm.er, supra, the employee could accept 
compensation and pursue the thi,rd party, subject· only to 
the right of the employer to be reimbursed for his expendi-
ture under the Act. 
Section 12 (Acts 1936), the section which is controlling in 
determining the question discussed here, is identical with 
1Seetion 12 (Acts 1920) which was construed in the three la.st 
mentioned cases;. with the sing·le exception that the fourth 
paragraph of the present Act, which .Provides that in an ac-
tion by the employee against the third party that the em-
_ployer could prove his expenses, etc., and have the same paid 
out of the judgment against the third party. In view of the 
similarity between the two sections,.it is contended that the 
decision of this Court in construing the earlier Act is bind-
ing in construing the present section. The additional provi- . 
sion contained in the present Act, if anything, strengthens the 
construction of the earlier cases. 
'
1 (3) SECTION 12 (ACTS 1924). 
THE 'FIRST ELE.CTJON PROVISIQN IN THE. WORK-
1\IEN 'S COMPENSATION ACT. 
By the Acts of Assembly 1924, Chapter 318, page 478, Sec-
tion 12 of the Act was amended for the second time by leav-
ing the first paragraph of the Act of 1920. intact and adding: 
first, a proviso that an employee may institute an action at 
faw against a third party before an award is made under 
the .Act and "prosecute thn same to ib1 final determination", 
but either the acceptance of an award under the Act or the 
promtrement of a judgment in an action at 'law shall be a bar 
to proceeding· further with the alternate remedy; ~econd, it 
provided that the acceptance of an award by the employee 
operated as an ·assig·nment to the employer and insurance 
carrier; other than the above additions, the provisions of the 
1920 Act were retained substantially, however, a provision 
was added dealing with infants with which we are not con-
cerned. 
The principal difference between Section 12 ( Acts 19~4) 
and Section 12 (Acts 1920) is the provision in the Act of 
·.1924 that the acceptance of an 0:ward under the compensa-
tion Act or the procurement of a judgment in a.n action at 
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law shall constitute a bar to proceeding further with the ·al-
ternate remedy. It was, therefore, with the amendment of 
1~24 that an election on the part of the employee first came 
into being under the Virg·inia Workmen's Compensation Act, 
however, no bar was raised by virtue thereof until an award 
had been accepted under the Act or judgment rendered in 
an action at law against a third party. By the very terms 
:of the Statute, neither the filing of a claim for compensa-
tion by the employee nor the institution ·of an action at law 
, by- ·the employee ag·ainSit the third party constituted an 
14* election *or raised the bar against the alternate pro-
ceeding, but, on the contrary, it was necessary that 
either, (1) an award be made, or (2) a judgme:µt rendered; 
neither element is present in this case. Even under the Act 
of 1924 which contained the aforesaid election provision, 
your petitioner would have been entitled to compensation, 
even though ·the .employee, during his lifetime, instituted suit 
for personal injuries, but he did not "prosecute the same to 
its final determination'' nor procure a judgment; a fortiori 
should the claimant. he allowed compensation under the pres-
ent Act which contains 110 election provision whatsoever. · 
(A) CASES CONS.TRUING SECTION 12 (ACTS 1924) 
The first case, involving Section 12, Acts 1924, before this 
Court was Horsman v. R. F. ~ · P. Railroad Company, 155 
Va. 934, 936-939, in which the Court held that the acceptance 
of an award by the employee was a bar to an action at com-
mon law by the employee against the third party. In its 
opinion the Court approved the case of Smith v. Virginia 
Railway a;nd Power Company, sitpra, but stated that that 
case was controlled by Section 12 (A.cts 1920). _ 
In Williamson v. Wellman, 1.56 Va. 417, 427-430 (1931), the 
employee sued. the third party for damages, after he had ac-
cepted- an award under the Act from his employer. The de-
fendant :filed a plea in bar setting . up the award, however, 
with the consent of the employer: the writ was endorsed to 
show that the case was for the benefit of the employer. Held, 
that the action was for the sole be11:efit of th~ employer and 
that the recoverv would be limited to the compensation paid,· 
or which the employer was liable to pay, plus reason-
15* able expenses *and fees. The fact that the writ was 
endorsed with the consent of the employer to show that 
the action was for his. benefit distinguished this case from 
the Horsman· case. In jt8 opinion the Oourt reviewed Sec.-
tion 12 (Acts 1918 and 1920) and stated at pages 428-429 that 
, the five prov.isions contained in the Act seemed plain, how-
/ 
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ever, the provision for an election which was added in the 
1924 amendment created a conflict. In speaking of the con-
flict created by the amendment, the Court, in its opinion by 
Justice Hudgins, s~id at page 429: 
"In view of the construction of the Act prior to the amend-
ment and the amendment, this Court in cle_~iding the Hors-
man case applied the well known principle that where there 
is an inconsistent and irreconcilable provision in a .Statute, 
it should be construed so a_s to give effect to the latest ex-
pression of the Legislative intent. The new provision in the 
1~24 amendment shows an evident intent on the part of the · 
legislatur~ to include within its terms a negligent third 
· party.'' 
By giving effect to the new provision of the 1924 Act, rather 
than the old provisions which were retained in the Act, and 
which were in conflict with the new, the Court construed the 
Act to mean that the acceptance of the award by the em-
ployee barred his right to sue the third party at common 
law. 
The holding of the Horsman and Williamson cases was ap-
proved and confirmed in D. F. Tyler Corporation v. Evans, 
156 Va. 576, 580-581 ( June, 1931); T'ir.qinia Electric <t Power 
Company v. W. F. Mitchell, 159 Va. 855, 864-870 (June, 1932, 
rehearing January, 1933); Corri_qq,n Y. Stormont, 160 Va. 
727 (June, 1933). 
In N. <t W. Railway Company v. Farris, 156 Va. 205, 227-
228 (March, 1931), and in N. rt TV. Railway Company v. 
White, 158 Va. 243, 257-258 (.September, 1931), the Cou~t 
disting-uished those cases from the *Horsman and Wil-
16* Hamson cases on the ground that there was .no evidence 
to show that an award had been accepted by the em-
ployee before instituting the suit against the third party. In 
both of those cases' a claim had been made for compensation 
against the employer prior to the suit at common law against 
the third party, however, the Court held that the making 
of a <!laim was not sufficient to rni~e the bar of an election 
and the action was maintainable under the Acts of 1924. The 
instant case is the rever8e of the situation obtaining in the 
last two cases in tha.t here the employee instituted an action 
at law and did not prosecute it to its final determination or 
judgment, and thereafter the claimant made claim for com-
pensation-which certainly would have been aUowed under 
t.he A et of 199.4-Hnd mogt certninlv should be allowed under 
the ·Act of 1936, after the Legislahire has stricken out of the 
Section. the election provfaion. 
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(4) SECTION 12 (ACTS 1930.). 
By A~ts of Assembly, 1930, Chapter 158, page 406, Section 
12 of the Act was amended a third time by adding the sec-
ond parag-raph to Section 12, as then written, which provided 
that in an action by the employee against the third paTty the 
employer cpuld prove his medical, etc., ~xpenses &nd have 
the same paid out of the judgment against tµe third party. 
'!1his amendment was not constcler~d by this Court i11 any of 
the c3:ses ~onstruing Section 12~ 
17"' *(5) SECTION 12 (ACTS 1932). 
By the Acts of Assembly, 1932, Chapter 279, page 485, 
Section 12 was ~mended the· fourth tjme by changing the 
fourth paragraph about the fifth line to provide that the ex-
cess of the · amount paid by the ~mployer as compensation 
s4oul¢1 b~ turned over to the employee, instead of holding 
the i:;~Ille f o;r th~ ~mployee, as formerly provided; sec9nd, 
by adding the-last parflgraph wherein it provided that noth~ 
ing contained in the Section should prevent the employee 
or his personal representative frol,Il receiving the full amount 
of any recovery against a third partv less the amount of 
compe:p.satio1+ paid or payable and other expenses. 
In Virginia )Electric & Power Company v. W. F. Mitchell, 
159 Va. 855, 868, at a rehearing in January, 1933, the Court 
said of thi$ amendment, at page 869: · 
"It is useless to discuss the matter f~rther, for by the 
1932 amendment to the Act it seems that in such actions in-
stituted by or for the benefit of an employer or carrier the in-
jured employee, or his personal representative, is entitled to 
'the full amount of any recovery ag·ainst. a third (negJigent) 
party less the amount. of compensation paid or payable and 
other expenses provided for in this Act' ~nd to- that extellt 
at least the legislature intended to modify the decisions in 
the cases cited.'' 
It was d~:finitely settled, the ref ore, by the 1932 amendment 
t.4at in an action by, or for the benefit of, the employer or 
the (}a:rrier thl\,t the employee was entitled to a full recovery 
for his dama,ges from the third party, les~ the amount of 
compensation, and or expenses, paid or payable under the 
Act. 
· It should be noted, however, that the amendment of 1932 
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retained the election provision whic4 was incorporated 
18* into the Act in '*1924. Even though the employee could 
obtain a full recovery for his injuries, in an action 
agavnst the third party by the employer or carrier, he could 
not obtain a judgment against the third party and there-
after, for any reason, make claim for and obtain compen-
sation; nor could he acc.ept compensation and sue the tnird 
party by himself, because the 1932 Act retained the election 
provision which barred the exercise 'of the two remedies by 
the employee. The amendment of 1932, therefore, eliminated 
the defense of the third party, that the employee had accepted 
compensation and could not obtain the excess recovery in 
an action by the employer ag·ainst the third party, as pro~ 
nounced in the Williamson case, hut it did not eliminate the 
·defense .of the employer that the employee had obtained a 
judgment against the third party and could not later · claim 
compensation under the Act. This feature is particularly im-
portant in construing the Act of 1936, for the reason that 
the Legislature of 1936 struck out of the Act the aforesaid 
election 1 provision. 
(6) SECTION 12 (ACTS 1936). 
. ,By Acts of Assembly, 1936; Chapter 369, page 591, Section 
· 12 of the Act was amended the fifth time by striking out all 
of the 1924 amendment and all of the 1932 amendment. Sec-
tion 12 (Acts 1936), which is controlling in this case, is com-
posed of the Section of the Act as written in 1920, plus the 
fourth paragraph of this Act which was first enacted in 1930. 
By this amendment the election provision, which fi'rst came 
into being in 1924, was stricken from the Act, and at 
19* the same *time the provision of the 1932 Act, providing 
for the full recovery for the employee, which was made 
necessary by the aforesaid election provision, was eliminated 
also. In construing the 1936 amendment to give effect to 
the legislative intent, the conclusion is inescapable that the 
Legislature intended to and did abolish the election provision, 
which made it necessary for the employee to decide whether 
he shoµld accept an award, which is necessarily a conserva-
tive amount, fixed by the Act, without consideration,of fault, 
and because of the leg·al status, prior to the Act, arising out 
of the relationship of employer and employee, or whether 
he should pursue the third party to a final determination of 
l1is riirhts, the decision wI1en made resulting in a bar to any 
alternate remedy; the result of which was necessarily, more 
often· than not, unknown. The Legislature eliminated the 
burden of electing- between two remedies and the rig·hts of 
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the employee were restored as they existed prior to the 
amendment of 1924. The employee was placed in the same 
position as he was under the Act of 1920; he could accept 
compensation and sue to recover from the third party, or 
sue the third party and then claim compensation, subject 
only to the right of his employer to be reimbursed-all of 
which is "manifestly just". By the amendment, the third 
party, who was never regulated by or contemplated to be 
within the purpose of The Virginia Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, lost completely all of the defense given him by the 
1924 amendment to Section 12, which defense had been cur-
tailed by the 1932 amendment, and the employer lost the de-
fense that a judgment had been obtained against the third 
party. As the amendment of 1936 is identical with Sec-
20* tion 12- (Acts 1920) with the sole *exception of the fourth 
paragraph and since this Court construed this .Section 
in Sou,thern Railway Company v. U. 8. Casualty Comp(J/Yl,y, 
supra, Smith v. Virginia Railway and Power Company, supra, 
and C. ~ 0. Railway Co'Ynpanv v. Palnier, snpra, it follows 
that the Legislature intended to make statutory the law as 
enacted in 1920 and as enunciated by this Court in the three 
last mentioned cases. 
It is submitted, therefore, that Section 12 of The Virginia 
Workmen's Compensation Act contains no election provision, 
either expressly or impliedly, and that your petitioner is not 
barred from filing· claim for and receiving compensation un-
der the Act for the death of the employee because of the Sec-
tion on the ground that the employee had instituted a com-
mon law action against a neg·ligent third party for personal 
injuries; to construe the Act otherwise is equivalent to read-
ing into it something that is not there. 
This Court recently said in Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal 
Company, Inc., 179 Va. 790, 796 (June, 1942): 
"Although in derogation of the common law, it (the Act) 
is highly remedial and should be liberally construed in fa-
vor of the workman.'' 
(B) NO-ELECTION WAS MADE EITHER BY THE EM-
PLOYEE OR BY THE CLAIMANT IN 
THIS CASE. 
The employee instituted an action at law against a third 
party for personal injuries in the Circuit Court for the 
County of Fauquier, Virginia, on March 8, 1941, and after 
the employer had filed suit against the same third party for 
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property damages arising out of the same collision. He did 
not and could not have ·sued, of course, for death by wrong-
ful act. It is certain that no election was made by the 
21 * ~ employee between suing the third party for wrong-
ful death and accepting an award for compensation for 
his death; the employee had no such opportunity and could 
not have refused to accept compensation for his death. The 
action against the third party was set for trial, however, the 
death of the employee intervened on May 13, 1941, before 
the trial date and on and before May 21, 19'41, the employer 
and insurance carrier were advised of the claim for com-
pensation for the death of the employee by. your petitioner, 
as provided for under the Act. It is clear, therefore, that 
your petitioner, the claimant, made claim for compensation 
for the death under the Act immediately, or shortly there-· 
after, the death occurred and the rig·ht accrued to her. On 
July 15, 1941, the insurance carrier informed your petitioner 
that it would not pay compensation voluntarily and on the 
same day a formal application or claim was filed with the 
Industrial Commission of Virginia by the claimant. It was 
after that time and on July 15, 1941, that your petitioner 
advised the employer, the insurance carrier and the Indus-
trial Commission that she expected to take the necessary 
steps to protect her interest in the case against the third 
party in the event the employer or insurance carrier failed 
to do so, and it was after this notice. and opportunity to the 
employer and insurance carrier to .take such steps as they 
deemed necessary, that your petitioner, on September 22, 
1941, revived the case against the third party in the name 
of the personal representative of the decedent in order to 
prevent the case from being discontinu()d. By this action the 
interest -of the employer and the insurance carrier in the ac-
tion against the third party was protected; it certainly wasn't 
prejudiced and both had failed to take any action against 
· the third party from May 21, 1941, the date claim was 
22* · made for *compensation. 
The employee had no opportunity to accept compen-
sation for his death or to sue the third party for death by 
wrongful act. The claimant, having such an opportunity 
after the death of the employee, claimed compensation 'for 
his death under the Act, shortly after the right accrued to 
her. 
In the case of Dollman v. Baker Dri?Jeway Compa;ny, 20 
0. I. C. 126 (April 15, 1938), which was decided by the Com-
mission after the amendment to Section 12 (Acts 1936), it was 
held that the claimant in that case was precluded from claim-
ing compensation for the death of her decedent after suing 
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a negligent third party for death_ by wrongful .act That 
case, even conceding tho grounds for the conclusion therein 
stated to be correct, is easily distinguishable from the case 
of your petitioner. In the Dollman case the employee was 
killed outright on January 20, 1937, and his personal repre-
sentative instituted an action at law against the negligent 
third party for death by wrongful act, and thereafter and 
on January 20, 1938, the last day on which a claim could be 
filed for compensation, made a claim for compensation and 
for .the death under the Act. In its opinion the Commission 
in quoting. from Ruling Case Law1 Volume 9, page 958, said 
at page 128! 
'' The . doctrine of election of remedies applies only where. 
there are two or more remedies, all of which exist at the time 
of election. and which are alternative and inconsistent with 
.each other; and not cumulative; so that, after the proper 
ohoice of one, the other or others are no longer_ available. 
This is upon the theory that, of several inconsistent remedies; 
the ·pursuit of one necessarily involves or implies the neg·a-
tion of the others. "'\'\Thether co-existent remedies are incon-
sistent is to be determined by a consideration of the relation 
of the parties with reference to the right sought to be en-
f otced as asserted in the pleadings.'' 
23* "The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the 
Dollman case in that the claimant in this case never 
sued a third party at common law, but instead, claimed com.., 
pensation for the death under the Act as soon as the right 
accrued to her. 
(C) THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IS NOT AP~ 
PLICABLE. 
Neither the employElr nnr its insurance ca.rrier have been 
prejudiced in their right of subrogation against the third 
party, neither has changed position as the result of any ac-
tion by the employee or the claimant; neither has lost or given 
up. any right by .virtue 0£ any a~t of the employee or of the 
clrumant. The right of suhrogahort granted the employer or 
its carrier, ·under the Act, arose upon the ma.kin~ of the 
claim for compensation by tlle claimant on and before May 
21.. 1941, however, neither tho employer nor insurance carrier 
attempted to exercise this l'ight of ~nbrogation from: that time 
until September 21, 1941., when the case of the employee, 
against the third party was revived by ttdding the name of 
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tlte personal representative of the employee. as plaintiff and 
the case continued, at the instanee of your petitioner, but this 
step of September 21, 1941, was not taken until long after 
the notice of July 15, 1941, in which the employer and car-
l'ier, as well as the Commission were informed that the peti-
tioner would protect her interest against the third part)1 in 
event the employer or insurer failed to take action in the case ; 
neither did. 
The defendant insurP.r investigated the facts surrounding 
this collisiou in which the <~mployee was injured and the em-
ployer suffered property damage and based on the facts sup-
plied by the insurer, the pleading-s in the suits of the 
24* employee and emplo)rer against the third .... party were 
prepared. The employer had a trial of its property 
damage case against the third party 011 May 29, 1941. It i:s 
dear. therefore, that this is not a case where the employer 
and the insurer have not had an opportunity to determine 
the facts surrounding the collision or to prosecute the claim 
against the third party, but on the contrary, it is apparent 
that the employer and the insurer were advised of all of the 
prerequisites necessary to protect their right of subrogation. 
In the Dollman case, supra, the claimant waited until the 
last day for making a claim for compensation, which was 
also the la.st dav before the bar of the Statute of Limitation 
fell in an action .. against the third party, and by virtue of that 
state of facts the employer and the insurance carrier were 
precluded from exerch:;ing their right of subrogation against 
the third party because the bar of the Statute of Limitation 
would have fallen before they could have instituted suit, see 
U. 8. Fidelity & Guaranty Conipany v. Blue Diamond Cnal 
Co·mpa,ny, 161 Va. 373 (September, 1933); Corrigan v. St()r-
mont, 160 Va. 72-7 (June, 1933). That action by the principal 
claimant, resulting as it did in taking· away the right of sub-
rogation of the employer and of the carrier and absolutely 
precluding them from an opportunity for reimbursement, 
rightfully estopped the principal claimant from asserting- a 
different position and claiming compensation from the em-
ployer and the bar of e.c:toppd was properly interposed. The 
claimant, in the Dollman case, therefore, clearly should not 
have received an award under the Act, after taking a position 
that prejudiced the employer or immrance carrier in the ex-
ercise of a right gTanted them by the same Act. 
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CONCLUSION. 
It is respectfully submitted, the ref ore, that the claimant 
is not barred by Section 12 from receiving compensation for 
the death of the employee under the Act on the ground that 
the employee instituted an act.ion at law against the third 
party during his lifetime; that ~o election has been made by 
the employee or the claimant; that the doctrine of estoppel 
is not applicable, and, therefore, your petitioner prays that 
an appeal be granted to her aud that the final award of· the 
said Commission be reviewed, r~versed · and set aside and 
this case remanded to the Commission with direction to award 
compensation to your petitioner, the claimant, as provided 
in the afore said Act. 
Counsel for petitioner desires to state orally the reasons 
why the final award complained of should be reviewed and in 
ihe event an appeal is granted, counsel will adopt this peti-
tion as the opening· brief for the appellant. 
A copy of this petition, pursuant to the rules of this Court, 
was delivered to John L. Ahbot, of counsel for Drinkard-
Payne Buick Corporation, employer and The Employers Lia-
bility Assurance Corporation, Limited, insurer, defendants, 
on the fifth day of August, 19·42. 
This petition, together with a copy of the record of 'this 
case duly certified by the Secretary of the Industrial Com-
mission of Virginia, will be filed in the office of l\L B. Watts, 
Clerk, Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, at Rich-
26• mond, to be by him delivered.to a justice ~of the Court. 
Of Counsel: 
Respe.ctfnlly s11bmitted, 
MABEL W. DRINKARD, By ·wM. ROSENBERGER, JR., 
Attorney for petitioner. 
PERROW & ROSENBERGER. 
Lynchburg, Virginia, August 5, 1942. 
The undersigned, E. M. Frost and Wm. Rosenberger, Jr., 
attorneys duly qualified to practice in the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, whose addresses are Lynchburg, Vir-
ginia, do hereby certify that in o.ur opinion the final award 
of the Industrial Commission of Virginia in the case of Mabel 
M. W. Drinkard v. Drinkard-Payne Buick Corp., etc. i9 
W. Drinkard against Drinkard-Payne Buick Corporation, em-
ployer, and The Employers Liability· Assurance Corporation, 
Limited, insurer,. oug·ht to be reviewed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia. 
E. M. ],ROST, 
WM. ROSENBERGER, JR. 
The receipt of a copy of the within petition for~ appeal 
is hereby acknowledged this the 5th day of August, 1942. 
JOHN L. ABBOT, 
Attorney for Drinkard-Payne Buick Corpo-
ration and The Employers Liability As-
surance Corporation, Limited. 
Received .August 6; 1942. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 




M. B. W. 
William M. Drinkard ( deceased), Employe; Mabel W. Drink-
ard et al., Claimants, 
v. 
Drinkard-Payne Buick Corporation, Employer, The Employ-
ers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, Insurer. 
Claim No. 556-631. 
May 11, 1942. 
Claimant-in-chief appeared in person. 
Perrow and Rosenberger for claimants. 
W. Worth Ma.rtin for defendant. 
Hearing before Chairman Nickels, at Lynchburg, Virginia, 
September 26, 1941. 
Nickels, Commissioner, rendered the opinion. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT. 
WiJ]4~m M. Drinkard wa.s injured by an accident arising 
out of 11,nd in the course of his employment, on January 23, 
1941, while working for the employer at an average weekly 
wage in excess of that yielding the maximum compensation 
benefit of $16.00 per week. The nature of the injuries sus-
tained were described as •'two ribs fractured and general 
bruises.'' The injured employe died of a cerebral hemor-
rhage, on May 13, 1941. The dependents of the deceased 
were Mabel ·wmis Drinka1·d, the widow, and William .M. 
Drinkard, Jr., a son, born November 25, 1924. 
The case was def ended on two gTounds, viz. : 
First. It was alleged that there was no eonnection be--
tween the acc.iden t and death. 
Second. The injured employe, the decedent, had instituted 
an action by notice and· motion for damages against the neg-
ligent third party which constituted an election un-
page 2 ~ der Section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
and bars the claim of the dependents herein from 
the benefits provided by the Act. 
Upon examination of the deceased, in October, 1940, there 
was found evidence of slight hypertension. A physician 
friend had made several examinations of the deceased 's blood 
pressure covering a period of time and he stated that it 
averaged about 155. At times it would be higher, and again 
lower. There was observed no rapid change and the blood 
pressure was considered as safe. 
:H'ollowing the accident there were symptoms· of headache, 
which were attril)uted more to a cervical artl,ritis than as a 
result of hypertension. Also, there was an increaRe in. bfood 
pressure following the accident ranging from 200 to 220. The 
injured employe had been resting daily at noontime and had 
frequently returned home a.t an earlier hour in the afternoon 
than had been previously customary. There had been ob-
served in his demeanor a lack of self-confidence, together 
with a loss of working efficiency. 
All of the physicians who testified stated that the accident 
was a contributory cause to the increase in blood pressure. 
The la.y testimony and the ~xpert medical evidence show per-
ceptible changes to have begun with the accident and to have 
continued without an intervening efficient cause to interrupt 
their course until death ensued. 
The claimants have made a. prfrna facie case by establish-
ing that the accident was a contributory cause to death by 
M. W. Drinkard v~ Drinkard-Puyne Bttick Corp., ~tc. ~- 21 
h_aving aggra.vated the pre'-existent condition of hyperten-
s10n. 
However; the injui'erl ernploye had instituted; oii March 8, 
1941, an action by notice and motion against the negligent 
third partv in the Circuit Court of Fauquier Countv. After 
his death the case was revived in the name "'of Mabel 
page a ~ Willis Drinkard, _ the .i\ridow, by order entered. on 
, 1Septembor 22., 1941, and the case was continued 
generally. 
,On July 11, 1941, the claimants, thr011gh their attorneys, 
made application for compensation benefits under Section 40 
of the Workmen's Compensation .Act. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
Tlhe legal question of whether the claimants are barred 
from assertin~ a claim. ttnd~r the Act, in vie,v of their de-
cedent having· instituted_ an aotion at law to recover damages 
from the neglig(mt third pa,tty; depeildei upon a construction 
of Section 12 of the .Act . h.nd adjudieated cases construing 
the same. This section. of the . .Act has inidergone several 
amendments and casss havP. adsert '\\1hich have necessitated . 
its construction. Sedion 12. as t-ontained in the Acts of 
General .Assembly of 1'918; i:l.t page 637; provided, as follows, 
viz.: 
'' The dghts and remedies herein gtanted to an employc 
where he and l1is employ~r have acdepted the provisions of 
this a.ct respectivelv to pay and accept compensation on ac-
count of personal injury ~t death by accident sha.11 exclude 
all other tights and remedies of such c1nployee; his p~tsonal 
rep1iesentative, parent~, dependents or next of ltiii; at com-
mon law or oth~rwise on ac~-oi.irtt of stich injury, loss of serv-
ice or death.;, 
It was amended in the Acts of 1920, at page 256, to read, 
as follows., viz. : 
'' The ril!hts and remeclies herein granted to an employe 
where he ahd his employer have accepted the provisions of 
this act respectively to pay and accept compensation on ac~ 
count of personal injuty Or death by accident shall exclude 
all other rights and remedies of such employee, his 
pag·e 4 ~ personal representAtive, parents, dependents or 
next of kin, at comnion law or otherwise on account 
of such injury, loss of service or death. · 
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"The making of a lawful claim against an employer for 
compensation under this act for the injury or death of his 
· employee shall operate as a11 assignment to the employ~r of 
any right to recover damag~~ which ~he injured employee or 
his personal representative or other person may have against 
any other party for such injury or deatb, and such employer 
shall be subrogated to any such right and may enforce, in 
his own name, or in the name of the injured employee or his 
· personal representative, the legal liability of such other 
party. The amount of compensation paid by the employee 
or the amount of compensHtion to which the injured employee 
or his dependents a.re entitled shall not be admissible a.s evi-
dence in any action brought to recover damages, but any 
amount collected by the employer under the provisions o:f 
this section in excess of the amount paid by tl1e employer or 
for which he is liable shall be held by the employer for the 
benefit of the injured employee or other person entitled 
thereto, less such amounts as are paid by the employer for 
reasonable expenses and attorney's fees. Provided, that no 
comp~omise settlement .sl1all be made by the employer or 
insurance carrier in the exercise of such right of subroga-
tion without the approval of the industrial commission and 
the injured employee . or the personal representative or de-
pendents of the deceasP.d employee being first had and ob-
tained. 
I 
''Where any employer is insured against liability for com-
. pensation with any insurance carrier, and such in-
page 5 ~ surance carrier shall have paid any compensation 
for which the employer is liable or shall have as-
sumed the liability of the employer therefor, it shall be sub-· 
rogated to · all the rights and duties of the employer, and 
may enforce any such rights in its own name or in the name 
of the injured employee or his or her personal represent-
ative, pro:vided, how~ver, nothing herein shall be construed 
as conferring upon insurance carriers any other or further 
rights than those existing in the employer at the time of· the 
injury to his employee, anything in the policy of insurance 
to the contrary notwithstanding. 
''Nothing in t1lis act contained shall be construed to make, 
for the purposes of tl1is ac.t, the employees of an independent 
contractor the employeeR of the person or corporation em-
ploying or contracting ·with such independent contractor.'' 
Again it was amended in the Acts of 1924, at page 478, by 
the insertion of the lang11age hereinafter quo~ed, the phrase 
relating to an election being underscored for -emphasis, viz.: 
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· ''* • * provided, however, that. where such employee, his 
personal representative or other person may have a right tn 
recover damages for such injury, loss of service or dGa.th 
from any person or persons other than such employer, he may 
im;titute an action at law against such third person or per-
. sons before an award is made under this act and prosecute 
the same to its final determination, bu,t either the acceptance 
of an award hereunder, or the procurement of a judgment 
moo action at law, sha.ll be a bar to proceeding further with 
the alternate remedy." 
Further, it waa amended in the Acts of 1936, at 
page 6 } page 591, which restored the language to that of 
the 1920 amendment, except that the following 
parag·raph was inserted, viz. (Italics ours) : 
'' Tn any suc~b action by such employee, his personal rep-
resentative or other person against any person other than 
the employer, the court shall, on petition or motion of the 
employer at any time prior to verdict, ascertain tbe amount 
of _expenses for medical, surgical and hospital attention and 
supplies, and funeral expenses, ineurred by the em_ployer un-
der the provisions of this act, and in event of judgment 
against such person other than the employer, the court shall 
in its order require that thfl judgment debtor pay such ex-
penses of the employer so ascertained by the court out of 
the amount of the judgment, so far as sufficient, and the httl-
ance, if any, to the judgmPnt creditor.'·' 
The judicial construction of fp.is section in its present 
wording, sa.ve for the language quoted above, remains as it 
was after its enactment in 1920. The various cases constru-
ing the 1924 amendment, which clearly provided for an elec-
tion, are not applicable in this regard to the present wording 
of the section. It is of importance, in the application of the 
adjudicated cases to the facts in the instant case, to observe 
which ar.e in point in construing similar language. 
The purpose of .Section 12, as originally enacted in ] 918, 
effective on January 1, 1919 (Acts of 1918, a.t page 637), was 
to debar tl1e injured employe from pursuing all other rights 
and remedies on account of such injuries. It was stated by 
the Court, in the case of Sonthern Railway Company v. United 
States Casualty Company, 136 Va. 475, ut pagP. 482, _ that 
"Under Section 12, in the original Act (Acts of 
page 7 } 1918, at pag·e 640), the employe to whom compensa-
- tion was paid for personal injuries was debarred 
, I 
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froni pursuing all other l'ights ancl remedies on account of 
such: injuries.'' 
Likewise the Court reiterated the foregoing co~tr~ction 
in the case of C. and 0. Railwa.11 Compmzy v. Palmer, 149 Ya. 
560, at page 572, in the language following, viz.: 
''Into the construction of every act must be read the pur-
pose of the legislature, and that underlying purpose in this 
instance was to give relief to workmen. This relief in the 
nature of things had to he cha1·ged against the employer. 
Section 12 in the original act of 1918 ( Acts of 1918, c. 400), 
consisted only of what is now the 'first paragraph 'of that 
section as amended by the Act~ of 1920. It said that an P.m-
ployee who had recmved compensation under this act from 
his employer should not thereafter sue him-a declaration 
manifestly just.'' 
Tl.he fore going expressions of the Court in dee.iding tb~ 
cases cited show the· mBni.fest purpose of Section 12 as en-
acted in 1918. There are no adjudicated cases wherein it 
was specifically in issue. 
The 1920 amendment (Acts of 1920, at p~ge 256), quoted 
above, ·became effective on July 1, 19'20. The purposes of 
the amendment arc shown by the case of Southern Railway 
Oompanv v. United Htaf<'s .Oasuo.Uy Company, 136 Va. 475, 
the fiTst one tp arise under its provisions . 
. In that case an employe was injured in a railway crossing 
accident wltlle driving a truck of the employer. The .em-
ployer carried workmen'e compensation insurance upon its 
employes with the United States Casualty Company. The 
injured employe asserted hi~ rights under the Virginia Work-
men's Compensation Act. An award was entered 
page 8 ~ by the Commission in his favor and against the 
employer and insurance carrier. The last ·named 
havin~ assumed the liabilitv of the employer to the claimant, 
it instituted an action a_gahist the railway to recover damages 
for the, injuries sustained by the claimant under the subroga-
tion features of Section 1~ of the Act. A judgment in favor 
of the insurance c_arrier was sustained upon an appeal in 
that case. 
In discussin:2: the purposes of the amendment, the Court 
stated, inter alia : 
''Under section 12, in the original act ( Acts 1918, page 
640), the employee to whom compensation was paid for per-
sonal injuries was debarred from pursuing all other rights 
and remedies on account of sueh injuries. Under this '"sec-
. I 
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tion, in the amelldatory ~ct, it i~ ~le~r that upon the :qiakiµg 
of ~ lawful claim QY the eip.ployee agaip.~t his employer, the 
employer, by op~r;:1.tion of law, Qecomes the assignee of any 
right to re¢over d~m.l:l.ges whiG4 the3 injured emplqyee, or 
his persollal repre$~µtative, may h~ve against any other 
party for ~uch inj-ury or qeath; a11-d such employer is sub-
rogated to such rig-lit of his ~µip}9yee a~y may enforce the 
same in his ow11, name, or in the :p.aµie of t4~ employee.'' 
It is made clear by the langu.~ge u~eq. t}13:t th~ employer is 
by operation of law subrogated to any right to recover dam-
ag~s which th~ ~j~red e~plgy~ or his pers<;ma.} representa-
tive may pave against 8;ny <.>th~r na,rty for such i:Q.jury or 
death, and ~ay epforc~ t4~ s~me. in jts own na.rne or in the 
:µ~~e pf the ~:rµplgy~~ 
At page 483, ibid., j~ i~ m~de ~l~f;IJ th8;.t the making of a 
lawful claim by tl!e ~~~~:qi11nt ~s th~ ~gle condition precedent 
to the employ~r 's as~erting tJl:e ~!ight of suqr<_>gation; when 
_ the emplpy~ fil~s ~ l3;wfl~l cl~jm, the rights of the 
page 9 }- einployer, 3:s his ~ssig}lee, "~elate b~ck and are the 
sam~ as those of the eJ.llploy~ at the time of the 
injury.'' In s-µpp~rt of these coµcl"9sioµ~ tl!e l~ngµage of 
the Court is, af(follows~ vi~~; · 
'' At the time of th~ injury to fq~ employee, the employer 
ha4 the right, upon t:P~ lllaking of a lawf-µl claim by tp.e em-
ployee again~t the employer fpr coQ1pens&tton under the act, 
to recover sucl1 <;laµipges as th~ ipj~red e1t1ployee might re-
cover against any other party, for su9h damages. Upon 
the. making of s-ueh clami, the clllployer 's rights, as assignee 
of the employee, relate back ~'P-d are tlie same as those of the 
employee at the ttme of the injt~ry. '' 
The case of S1r,,ith v. Vir.Qinia, Railway and Power Com-
va12,y, 144 Va. 169, was decided py the Court on January 14, 
1'926, and is the second decision d~aling with the 1920 amend-
merit to Section 12 of the Act. .~n injtired claimant .in this 
case recoverecl an awa,.rd of ~omperis1:1tion benefits from his 
employer. Thereafter he ~oug·ht a recovery for damages 
against tl1e negligent third party. The case was pending 
before the lower Court, when, :more than one year after the 
date of the accident, a motion was made to dismiss on the 
ground that the claimant had no ri~bt to prosecute the case 
under Section 12. ~he lower Court permitted the pleadings 
to be amended to show that the action of the claimant was 
for the benefit of the employer. It was contended that this 
amendment having been made more than one ye~r after the 
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date of the accident, the cause was barred by the statute of 
limitations. The Court. disposed of the amendment by saying 
that it was unnec.essary to so amend the pleadings but that it 
was appropriate, thereby affirming the lower Court on this. 
point. It disposes of the plea of the statute of limitations 
by holding that the amendment did not relate to 
page 10 } the merits of the case; for that reason a new case 
had not been made, and the plea. was rejected. 
The wording of the decision on these issues shows clearly the 
reason the ref or, as follows, viz.: 
''The contention is that Stratton could not maintain the 
action because of the first clause of section twelve of the 
act, hereinbefore quoted. That clause, however refers· only 
· to the rell!edy of an employee against his employer, and it is 
only his right to sue his employe~ for damag~s which is barred 
by the acceptanc.e of compensation under the act. No argu-
ment to support this conclnsion is necessary, as it seems to 
us, because he who runs may read it in the statute. 
'' The next clause of the section quoted refers to an en-
tirely different right, and subrogates the employer who has 
paid compensation to his (lmployee under the act to the right 
to enforce any legal liability against such other party as 
may be liable in damages for the injury. The employer is 
not only subrog·ated to any such right of the employee to 
enforce· any such legal liability against another: but the stat-
ute in express terms pro,idt,s that he may enforce it 'in his 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his per-
sonal representative.' 
'' The citation of other cases relating to · actions in the 
name of one party for· the benefit of another affords little aid, 
because the determination of the quest.ion here raised de-
pends upon the construction of this particular statute. The 
. purpose is ~o clearly expressed in the statute that 
page 11 ~ we find ourselves unahle to appreciate the conten-
·. tion. This action cnn be· maintained because the 
power of the iState to authori?'e it cannot be doubted, and by 
the languag·e m:;ed this power has been exerci~ed. That wl1ich 
is manifest certainly rP,quire::; no demonstration. It is ·so 
evident from our own statute that such an action against a 
third person may lJ() brought, either in the name of the in-
jured ~mployee or in the name of the emp]oyer, that 'Ye do 
nqt think it necessary to review the cases from other juris-
dictions in which such questions have been rni~ed. '' * ·* * 
"The amendment which the court allo·wed, while not neces-
sary may b.ave been appropriate. It was only because the· 
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defendant_ directed attention to the statute, and that the Vir-
ginia· Railway and Power Oompany had been thereby sub-
rogated to the rights of the plaintiff to the extent of the com-
pensation which it had paid him, that the amendmont was 
allowed. This was not the institution of a new action and 
was germane. It follows from this t11at the plea of the stat-
ute of limitations was properly rejected.'' 
This case reaffirms tbat of So'Uth.ern RailitJtly Gompan11 v. 
United States Casualty Compa,n,y, .~upra. It is apparent that 
the employer instituted the acti<~n at l~w agaip.st the negli-
gent third party in the name of the injm·ed employe, who had 
already filed his claim before the Industrial Commission. 
This case shows that the employer waR prosecuting a cause 
of action to which it was subrogated under Section 12. 
The next. case of valm~ in a. con~truction of Section 12, as 
amended in 1920, ·is that of C.. and O .. Railway Com-
page 12} pany v. Palmer, 149 Va. 560. This case is on all 
_ fours with the· two preceding cases and offers 
nothing ne:w insofar. as a constmction of Section 12 is in-
volved. The case of 8oi,.the.r'fl. Railway Co1n.pan11 Y. United 
8tates C~sualtz1 Company and 8rnith v. Vfrginia Railway and 
Power Company, supra, were cited and relied upon in decid-
ing the case under discussion. 
The following additiona.l quotations show the Court's in.: 
terpretation of the two preceding- case~, viz. : 
'' In principle the matter here suggested has already been 
passed upon by this court, and requires no elaborate consid-
eration. 801uthern Railwai1 Company v. [!. 8. Ca.w,alty Com-
pany, 136 Va. 475, 118 S. E. 266, presents facts strikingly 
like the case at bar except that there was no undertaking on 
tq.e.. p~ut of the employer to save the defendant harmless. It 
was said in a statement of facts that: 
'' 'At the time of the accident S. E. Moorefield, an employee 
of L. D. Moorefield, doing busi11:ess as Pure Food Bakery, 
acting within the SCQpe · of his employment, was driving an 
automobile truck, belonging to L. D. l\foo1·efield, over the 
Henry street crossing of the defendant's railroad in the city 
of Danville, Virginia. L. D. MoorefifJld carried a workmen's 
compensation insurance policy with tl1e plaintiff. The plain-
tiff, as such insurance .carrier, llavin9; assumed the liability 
of the employer therefor, paid S. E. Moorefield the compen-
sation due under the policy on account of his injuries, and 
claims to be subrogated to the rights of the employer in the 
premises.' 
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''The court in its opinion observed: 
. " 'We dissent from the contention of the de-
. pag¢ 1'3 ~ :fendant that under the provision of the statute 
· · just quoted the employer, at the time of the injury 
to the employe, had no rights which could be asserted and 
that. therefore, thr plaintiff here is undertaking to assert a 
right not_ vested in it by statute.' 
'' And held that: 
'' 'At the time of injury to the employe, the employer bad 
the rig·ht, upon the making of a lawful claim by the employee 
against the employer for compensation. under the act, to re-
cover such damages as the injured employee might have re-
covered against any other party for such damages. Upon 
making of such claim, the emplpyer's rights as assignee of 
the employee relate back and are the same as those of the 
employee at the time of the injury.' 
'' Tlb.is statute again came under consideration in Smith v. 
Va. Rwy. & Power Co., 144 Va. 169, 131. S. E. 440~ There 
Stratton was the motorman of a street car. Smith negli-
gently drove an automobile against and injured him. Strat-
ton under the workmen's comnensation act was awarded ' 
damages against the street car -company and was paid by it. 
He then brought an action in his own name against Smi t.h, 
and was allowed to amend his notice by inserting as plain-
tiff 'Virgi.nia Railway and Power Company, who sues in the 
name of vYillie Lee' Stratton.' Against this amendment Smith 
protested. 
'' The court said : 
" '(1) The contention is that Stratton could not maintain 
the action because of the first clause of section twelve of the 
act, hereinbefore quoted. That clause, l1owever, refers only 
to the remedy of an employee against his employer, 
page 14 ~ and it is only his right to sue his employer for 
damag·es which is barred by the acceptance of com-
pensation under the act. No argument to support this con-
clusion is necessary, as it seems to us, because he who runs 
mav read it in the statute. 
'' 'The next clause of the section quoted refers to an en-
tirely different right, and subrogateA the employer who has 
1Jaid compensation to his employee under the act fo the right 
to enforce any legal liability against such other party as 
may be liable in damages for the injury. The employer is 
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not only subro,gated to any such right of 'the employee to 
enforce any such legal liability ag·ab1st another, hut the 
statute in express terms provides that he may enforce it 'in 
his own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his 
personal representative~.' '' 
The amendment of 1924 (Ac.ts of 1924, at pag·e 478) pro-
Yided that the injured cmploye may prosecute his claim be-
fore the Industrial Commission and the cause of action 
against the negligent third party. However, the acceptance 
of an award or · procurcm~nt of a judgment in an action at 
law barred the alternate remedy. The express language of 
this amendment rendered this construction obvious. It says: 
'',, * * but either the. acceptance of an a'ward hereunder, or 
the procurement of of a judgment in an action at law, shall 
be a bar to procee~ing further with the alternate remedy.'' 
In the case of Horsma1t v. Richmond, Fr<.=dericksbwrg and 
Potomac Railroad Gotnpany, 155 Va.. 934, it was held that the 
injured employe, after having accepted an nwnrd from the 
employer, could not al~o maintain an action against the neg-
ligent third party. The Court pointed out in its 
page 15 ~ opinion in this case that the language of the Act 
had bren amended. Howevet, it reaffirmed the 
soundness of the decision in the case o:f Smith Y. Virg1.11,·ia 
Railway and Power Company, supra, under the language 
of Section 12 as it stood jn 1920. 
The language of Section 12 as amended in 1924 came be-
fore the Court in a number of cases. 
Other ea.ses under the amendment of Ul24, followiug the 
Horsman Gase, are :-N. and W. Railuiay Company v. Fari.~, 
156 Va. 205, 157 S. E. 81.9; Tf!illiamsnn v. }Vell1nan,, 156 Va. 
417, 158 S. E. 777; Virginia, l!Jlectrfo and Power Company v. 
Mitchell, 159 Va. 855, 164 S. E. 800, 167 S. E. 424; '1.'ylet v. 
E,zJans, 156 Va. 576; Solom,OA'l. v. Crill, 159' Va. 625, 166 S. E. 
467; Corrigan v. Stormant, 160 Va. 727, 170 S. E. 16. 
The language of the section having provided in express 
terms for an election of remedies, the foregoing c.ases are of 
. no material bearing on the construction of Section 12 of the 
Act in its present form. 
Section 12 wa.s again amended in 1936 (Acts of 1936, at 
page 591). The language thereof was restored to its status 
in 1920, the only difference being the clause quoied herein, 
authorizing the employer to be reimbursed out of the re-
covery against the negligent third party for ''medical, surgi-
cal, and hospital attention and supplies, and funeral ex-
penses, incurred by the employer,' 1 the same to be paid hy 
the judgment debtor after determination by the Court. 
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The foregoing·is believed to be an accurate history of both 
' the statute and case historv of Section 12 of the Act. The 
fundamentals to be gathered therefrom and its judicial inter-
pretation may be summarized, as follows, viz.: 
· · 1. The general purpose of the section is to hold 
page 16 ~ a negligent third party liable in damages for his 
negligence as in all other cases. The recovery 
from the judgment debtor is first npplied toward reimburs-
ing the employer in a sum equal to the monetary value of 
his liability to the employe under a valid award. Also, the 
employer is entitled to be reimbursed for medical attention 
expended in behalf of the injured employe, under Section 26 
of the Act, burial expenses not exce~ding the sum of $1.50.00, 
under Sections 39 and 41, and other items enumerated un-
der Section· 12, subject to determination by the Court in which · 
the action is· pending. If there be i recovery in excess of tbe 
foregoing, it, is payable to the judgment creditor for the bene-
fit of those entitled thereto. 
2. The rig·hts and remedies granted an employe under the 
Act are exclusive of all others against the employer. 
3. The making· of a law:ful claim against the employer op-
erates as an assignment to him of any right to recover dam-
ag·es which the injured employe or .his personal representa-
tive may have against the IJ,egligent third party. The em-
ployer is subrogated to the legal liability of such other party 
and is authorized to enf orc.e the same in his name, or in the 
name of the injured employe or his personal representative. 
The right to recov·er damages fa a.ssigned ipso facto upon the 
making of a lawful claim again.<;t an emvloyer, and the latter 
is also .~11,brogated to afl!J:l such right, including the right to 
P,nfo,:ce the same to the fnll extent of the legal liability of 
such other party. From the language used in the second 
paragraph, it is obvious that the legal right of the employer 
to recover against the negligent third party comes into be-
ing by operation of law immediately upon the making of a 
lawful claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 'rhe 
employer by express languag·e is then' subrogated 
page 17 ~ to any right the injured employe or his personal 
representative may have ag·ainst the negligent 
third party and may P-nf orce the same. The language of the 
section is so clear as to leave no doubt aboi1t its meaning. 
4. A careful study of this section and the experience of 
this department show that it was the intent of General .As-
semblyi to encourag·e the claimant to m~ke his claim first for 
compensation benefits under the Act. He has all to gain and 
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nothing to lose by following such procedure. An employer 
against whom an award has been entered will ordinarily not 
sacrifice a recovery againf.: t a negligent third party an.d for-
ieit the opportunitv to reimburse itself to the extent of all 
sums expended in the compensation case. The only excep-
tion we can mention to this rule is that wherein an insurance 
carrier underwrites.-Jboth the compensation liability of an 
employer against whom an aw81rd · has been entered by the 
Commission and the common law liability of the negligent 
third party. The insurance carrier would not institute in 
action at law to enforce a right to recover damages from a 
negligent third party whom it insured and, in effect, sue 
itself; it would not do so wl1en the potential liability of the 
third partv action was in excess of its established liability 
under an award of the Commission. 
Under the circumstances last mentioned, an employer who 
fails or refuses to prosecute the action against the negligent 
third party is subject to the rules of law respecting a. waiver 
of its rights or estoppel to enforce the same, dependent upon 
the circumstances of a particular case. 
Under the 1918 .A.ct, which was only the first paragraph 
of the present section, it was recognized that the injured 
employe could prosecute his claim before the Industrial Com-
mission based upon the relationship of employer 
page 18 } to employe and recoYer compensation b.enefits; 
also, that he could proBecute a common law action 
to recover damages from the third party liable therefor. The 
status of the law resulted in what mav be termed a double 
recovery. Tb remedy this condition Section 12 of the Act 
was amended in 1920. One of the very purposes of th~ amend-
ment was to put an end to a double recov-ery for· the same 
accident hut against different parties. The spirit of the 
amendment was to enable the injured employe to recover the 
~reatest sum that circumstances might warrant from either 
the employer or other party liable, but precluded a recovery 
from both by either joint or separate proceedings against 
them. Since recovery under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act is quicker, ~urer and with fewer pitfalls, the wording of 
the section is such as to off er every inducement to proceed 
:first in this forum. Thereby he has all to gain and nothing 
. to lose. Since the liability of the employer for whom the em-
ploye worked is in each instance, under circumstances of 
fact and law, less difficult to establish under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act than in an action at law, the claimant's 
best interests justify hi~ making first a claim for compensa-
tion. He has the optiou. of taking that course of procedure, 
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whic}l. is ·1ess expensive, mbre certain and speedier, in con-
trast wi:th one of less certainty. This is in ke.eping with the 
underlying principles of the administration of workmen's 
compensation acts in order to afford relief to tbc injured 
party at the _time when most be needs it. 
E,rom the standpoint. of equitable consideration, there is 
le SE'·. cogency of rea<:;oning and forceful thought to the idea 
of the injured person's prosecuting at the same time two 
remedies against different persons, one of whom has a vested 
right of reimbursement in the recovery against 
page 19 ~ the third party, than in the tl10ught that the party 
entitled to reimbursement should be able to make 
his own recovery. It does not appear from Section 12 that 
the right of an employer liable under the .A.ct shall he debarred 
from availing himself of· the rights and remedies assigned 
him by its express provisions upon the construction that the 
employe may proceed against both. In our opinion, this con-
struction is derog·atory of the purpose of the section aucl. re-
sults in de.stroying the rights and remedies gTanted t.he em-
nlover. 
- We admit that the section gives the claimant an interest 
in the recovery obtained by the employer against the third 
party, but only where there is a re·covery in excess of those 
sums in which the employer is to be reimbursed; the differ- · 
ence, if any, belongs to the injured employe. It ii;; probable 
that· the recovery will not be great eri.0ugh to exceed tl1e 
sum in which the employer shall he reimbursed. The con-
struction which we have been asked to place on this section 
would give the employe absolute control of the action at law 
although the recovery we!e less ·than enough to reimburse 
the employer and the employe were possessed of no interest 
in the re{!overy. . 
From the section and its history, it is cleat~ that the ex-
press purpose of its amendment in 1920 was to for bid a double 
recovery for the same accident by the injured person. The 
wording is so clear as to manifest a definite intent to assign 
and · subrogate the employer against whom a lawful claim 
has been made to any rights and remedies the injured em-
ploye may have, inelnding the rigllt to enforce the same. 
These ·a.re valuable rig·hts by express enactment; any con-
·struction which destroys them viofates their purpose. T,he 
language of the section, together with the other purpose of 
prohibiting a double recovery by the same person 
page 20 ~ for injuries susfained. in the same aooident, clearly 
indicate an intent to vest in the injured employe 
an election of proceeding at law against the tort feasor or to 
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make a claim against the employer. If this be true, why vest 
in an· employe who has only a beneficial interest in an excess 
recovery control over a right and remedy vested in the em-
ployer? It is obviously a contradiction to so interpret the. 
section. 
In the absence of a waiver or estoppel 011 the part of the 
employer or its insurance carrier of the right and remddy 
to which he is subrogatecl by an assignment under Section 
12, there. can be no further rights or remedy for the employe 
than the right to the excess recovery. 
There was no issue of fact or point of law in any of the 
. adjudicated cases, when carefully analyzed, as a decisive 
factor in the determination of the same, which indicates or 
holds that the employe may prosecute both the compensa-
tion case and the third party action. 
The issue presented in the instant case was involved in the 
case of Dollman v. Baker, 20 0. I. C., 126, and it was decided 
in favor of the defendant employer for the same reasons, al-
though unexpressed, as are contained herein. 
In the case of Ocean Accident and Guara'l'l,tee Corporation 
v. Cooper, 294 S. W. 248, the Court held, as follows, viz.: 
'' The right of subrogation is a valuable· right and cannot 
be destroyed by the voluntary act of the beneficiary without 
incurring the conseq~1ence of an e.stoppel.'' 
The section under consideration assigns and subrogates 
the employer to the cause of action and recovery. This be-
ing a valuable right, an employe who institutes first an ac-
tion a.t law against the third party is estopped from assert-
ing any right under the "\Vorkmen 's Compensation 
pag·e 21 } Act. The pro tanto interest he may hav~ had in 
an excess recovery by the employer agamst the 
third party does not destroy the rights granted the employer 
in such. specific language. .Any construction of Section 12 
which does so is the equivalent of a judicial repeal. 
The deceased having in his lifetime made an election by 
instituting an action at law, the prosecution ·of the compen-
sation claim filed later by the dependents, under Section 40 
of the Act, is barred. . 
In consideration whereof, the application of the dependent 
claimants herein before named for a recovery under the Work-
men's Compensation Act is denied and the case dismissed 
from the docket. 
Each party shall pay its respective costs in this proceeaing. 
34 · Supreme Court o·f .Appeals of Virginia 
.... 
·-
p'age 22 .h COMM!ONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
RICHMOND-
Claim No. 556-631. 
NOTICE OF AW ARD. 
WILLIAM M. DRINKARD. 
Date May 11, 1942. 
I 




To Drinkard Payne Buick Corporation (Employer) 
815 F'ifth Street · 
· Lynchburg, Virginia . 
. and Mrs. Mabel W. Drinkard ( Claiµ1ant) 
23 Huron A venue 
Lynchburg, Virginia. 
and Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation R 
(Insurance Carrier) 
Peoples National Bank Building 
Lynchburg, -Virginia. 
You are hereby notified that a hearing was held in the 
above styled ease before Chairman Nickels at Lynchburg, 
Virginia, on iSeptember 26, 1941, and a decision rendered on 
May 11, 1942, dismissing this claim on the ground that ·claim-
ant had instituted an action at law against the third party 
and is, the ref ore, barred from making claim for compensa-
tion as provided in Section 12 of the Ac.t. 
Each party will pay his· own cos~s in this proceeding. 
Attest: 
INDUS~rRIAL 001\fMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
W. },. ROBINSON 
Chairman 
W .. H1. BURSEY~ Secretary. 
M. w~ Drinkard v .. Di'irikard-Payne Buick Corp., etc. S5 
page 23} (OPINiON ON REViEW.) 
Willirull M. Drinkard (deceased), }Jmployee; Mahei W. Drink-
ard et at; Claimants, · 
v .. 
Drittlfard~Payne . Buick Corporation, Empioyer, The E1n.: 
ploye:rs' Liability .Assui:anbe Corp., Ltd~, InsufEh' .. 
Claim No. 556-631. 
Jul 10 1942. 
Perrow antl Ro~enberget. for claimants. 
W. W cfrth Martin for ttefendant. 
Review before the full Commission; at Richmond, "Virginia; 
oil June 1, 1942~ 
Robinson, Chairman, rendered ti1e opinion. 
U:pori. revi~~ of this case before t~e Iridustflal Coimili~oiO:h; 
on ;June 1; 1942, aii itgreetl sfat~mcnt of fact, sjg'iled by coun-
sel for the respective parties at issue, was filed and asked to 
be inMxporated into the recotd as. a part 0£ the fiildings of 
fact~ The. niotio:n to incqrporate t4e. same was granted and 
the agreed statement tif fact copied herein as a part of the 
record, to-wit: 
Employee was injured in automobile collision on j anuary 
2H, 1941, in Fauquier Co.q.nty, Virginia, while riding as ~ 
passenger in an ari.tbinobile of Employer. Employer sued 
third p~.rty for. property damage al}d ther~after and on 
·March 8, 1941, the employee sue'd the third party for personal 
injuries received in the collision. The facts obtained from 
an investigation of the citcuinstances surrounding- the colli-
sion, by the insurance carder of the employer, it being· the 
same carrier involved in this case, iT'ere used by both the em-
ployer and the employee in the preparation of the 
page 24 ~ pleadings in the suit ag·ainst the third party. On 
.. :March 26, 1941, the Circuit Court of Fauquier 
County, Virginia, set the cas~ of the employer against the 
third party for trial on :May 29, 1941, and the case of the 
employee a.gainst the third party for trial on J\f.ay 30, 1941. 
On May 13, 1941; the employee died. The case of the em-
ployer. against the third party was tried on l\fay 29, ] 941, and 
a verdict and judgment entered for the third party. The 
case of employee against third party was continued gen-
erally. · 
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On and before May 21., 1941, the employer was advised that 
a claim for ~ompcnsation would be made bv the dependents 
of the deceased employee, for Compensation, and the matter I 
· was taken -µp with the insurance carrier of the employer on 
that date.~ On July 11, 1941, the insurance carrier advised 
that it would not pay compensation voluntarily and on that 
date an application was mailed to the Industrial Commi~sion 
of Virginia for a hearing for compensation for the death of 
the employee. . 
On July 15, 1941, the employer was advised that tho claim-· · 
ant in chief would take the necessary steps to protect her 
h;.1.terest in the case against the tllirc1 pa.rty provided the em-
ployer did not prosecute the same; the full text of the notice 
being in the letter of July 15, 1941, to the employer and a 
copy sent to the insurance carrier and the Industrial Com-
mission, however, no action was taken in the case until Sep-
tember 22, 1941, when the case was revived in the name of 
the administratrix of the employee, with leave given to file 
such proper pleadings as may be necessary a.nd the case was 
continued, as shown by a teste copy of the order which was 
· filed in this case. 
page 25 t, In all other respects the opinion of Nickels, Com-
missioner, of May 11, 1942, and award authorized-
thereupon the same day are adopted and affirmed by the full 
Commission upon review. · 
lt'is ordered that the application for the review be stricken 
from the docket and the case be closed. 
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D-EP.A.RTMENT1 OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ·v1RGINIA 
RICHMOND 
Claim No. 556-631. 
William M. Drinkard. 
NOTICE· OF AW ARD. 
Date: July 10, 1942. 
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To Drinkard Payne Buick Corporation (Employer) 
815 Fifth Street 
Lynchburg, Virginia. 
and. Mrs. Mabel W. Drinkard (Claimant) 
23 Huron Avenue 
Lynchburg·, Virginia. 
and Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation 
(Insurance Carrier) 
Peoples National Bank Building 
Lynchburg, Virginia. 
You are notified that a review before the full Commission 
was held in the above styled case at Richmond, Virginia, on 
June 1, 1942, and a decision rendered on July lO, 1942, a<lopt-
ing the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing· 
Commissioner, with certain additions, as the findings of fact 
a.nd conclusions of law of the full Commission, and affirming 
in all respec.ts the award· issued thereon. 
Attest: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF VIRGINIA 
W. F. ROBINSON 
Chairman. 
W. F. BURSEY, 1Secretary. 
page 27 ~ I, W. F. Bursey, Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of Virginia, hereby certify that the 
fore going·, according· to the record of this office, is a trne and· 
- correct copy of the statement of findings of fact, conclusions 
. of law and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue 
in Claim No. 556-631, re : 
"William l\if. Drinkard (deceased), Employe; :Mabel Vi. Drink-
ard et al., Claimants, 
v. 
Drinkard-Payne Buick Corporation, Employer; The Em-
ployers' Lia.bility Assurance Corporation, Limited, In-
surer. 
I further certify that couusel representing the ~mployer, 
the Drinkard-Payne Buick Corporation, and the msurance 
carrier, The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, 
Limited, have notice that the Secretary of the Ind~strial Com-
I 
38 Supreme Court ,of Appeals of Virginia 
mission of Virginia, had been requested to . prepare. a certi-
fied' copy of the record fol' the purpose of an appeal to The 
Supreme·.Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
I further certify that counsel representing the claimant, 
Mrs. Mabel W. Drinkard, recP-ivecl, as evidenced by the United 
.States postal Registry Return Receipt card, on July 11, 1942, 
a. copy of the award of the Industrial Commission of Vir-
ginia, dated July 10, 1942. 
Given under my hand and the seal of the Industrial Com-
mission of Virg·inia, this, the twenty-ninth day of .July, 1942. 
(Seal) 
W. F. BUR.S.EY, Secretary, 
Industrial Commission of Virginia. 
A Copy.-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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